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Abstract  
The resource-based view (RBV) and the dynamic-capabilities approach (DCA) have 
emerged as two important frameworks in strategic management that seek to explain 
why firms are different. In recent years operations management scholars have sought 
to integrate both RBV and DCA within the field’s epistemological orientation to 
provide normative frameworks for practising managers. This paper argues that the 
structure of resources and capabilities are such that they present impediments to 
normative prescriptions. Using ideas from complex systems we argue that any 
framework for thinking about resource accumulation and capability development 
must take account of uncertainty and knowledge imperfections in the system. We 
contend that the real options framework is an appropriate heuristic for managing the 
process of capability development and a case study of a manufacturing operation is 
used to illustrate our ideas.          
Keywords  Resource-based view, Dynamic-capabilities approach, Real options, 
Open Systems, Case study 
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Introduction and overview 
RBV and DCA constitute two separate yet highly related streams of research in the 
strategic management literature. A fundamental question in the field of strategic 
management is how do firms create and sustain a competitive advantage (Rumelt et 
al. 1991). The resource-based view and the dynamic capability based approach have 
addressed this question in different ways. According to the RBV, competitive 
advantage and durable performance differences between firms are accounted for by 
asymmetric resource endowments with differential productivities (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1986; Conner, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Amit and Schoemaker, 
1993). In contrast, from the dynamic capabilities perspective performance 
differences across firms and over time are accounted for by differences in the 
capacity of firms to accumulate, deploy, renew, and reconfigure resources in 
response to changes in the external environment (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece et 
al. 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2000). Capabilities constitute 
individual skills, tacit forms of knowledge and social relations that are embedded in a 
firm’s routines, managerial processes, forms of communication and culture. In either 
case, resources and capabilities have characteristics that make them difficult to trade 
or imitate; hence performance differences between firms are to be expected, as they 
are a natural outcome of the idiosyncratic and path dependent histories in which 
resources and capabilities have evolved.  
Both approaches have proved to be attractive for operations strategy scholars for 
numerous reasons. The introverted orientation of both RBV and DCA enable them to 
emancipate the neglected strategic importance of operations. Since RBV and DCA 
represent two leading efficiency approaches in strategic management, they enable us 
to understand resources and capabilities embedded in operations as something more 
than strategizing around product market positioning.  
Amundson (1998) has argued for RBV to be used as a driver of field-based research 
in operations management. However, operations strategy scholars have made use of 
both approaches when discussing the intellectual foundations of operations strategy 
(Hayes and Pisano, 1994; Mills et al. 1995; Clark, 1996; Roth, 1996; Swink and 
Hegarty, 1998; Gagon, 1999; Slack and Lewis, 2001). It is difficult to find genuine 
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empirical research driven by RBV and DCA in the field of operations management. 
Recently, Schroeder et al. (2002) explored links between manufacturing resources 
and performance. In addition to conceptual discussions on revisions to the traditional 
operations strategy concept, RBV and DCA enter the general discussion within the 
field of operations management more explicitly (Lewis, 2000) or more implicitly 
(Spina et al. 1996; Spina, 1998; Bartezzaghi, 1999) when different best practices are 
discussed. For operations management scholars RBV and DCA presents an 
opportunity to establish the identity of the discipline around identification, transfer 
and application of different best practices. It seems, however, that scholars have not 
sought to identify themselves with exploring why capabilities or best practices 
emerge in the first place, how they develop and why they develop. The operations 
management literature acknowledges the evolutionary paths of capability or best 
practice development processes as a logical characteristic and recognise contingency 
factors that make these processes idiosyncratic, yet it is somehow assumed that 
development of best practices and valuable capabilities is a result of rational decision 
making about adopting a particular best practice or developing a certain capability. 
This way of thinking is congruent to the operations management field’s 
epistemological orientation on how to get thing done, which reflects the importance 
the field attaches to the utility of research for practising managers. It leads operations 
strategy scholars to a research agenda that makes RBV and DCA approaches 
operational. Both approaches should, therefore, help to develop prescriptive 
frameworks and universal principles for managing capabilities and applying best 
practices. This stream of thought largely neglects the point that choice decisions 
related to capability development are subject to uncertainty due to the complex, 
ambiguous and even paradoxical nature of organisational phenomenon. The real 
challenge in managing capabilities does not lie in identifying different best practices, 
exploring co-relations between them and performance, and studying contingencies 
that influence applications. The real challenge is to accept the problematic nature of 
the phenomena and begin the process of learning how to cope with uncertainty, 
ambiguity and complexity in the capability development process. 
Capability development has parallels with the application of the real options heuristic 
to strategy (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001; Bowman and 
Moskowitz, 2001; Kyläheiko et al. 2002), whereby a firm’s resources, capabilities 
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and knowledge create options for future exploitation. Investments in resources and 
capabilities are choice decisions made in the context of uncertainty, and as Loasby 
(2002) reminds us, it is the combination of time and uncertainty that makes real 
options potentially valuable. Real options are investments in physical and intangible 
resources that provide the firm with contingencies in an uncertain environment. The 
ability to alter a course of action in the light of new information is valuable and it is 
this flexibility that is captured by real options analysis.  Following the seminal work 
of Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973) and Cox et al. (1979) in financial option 
pricing, the field of real options has expanded rapidly over the last two decades, 
culminating in a wide range of applications (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; 
Trigeorgis, 1996; Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999; Copeland and Antikarov, 2001). All 
of these applications make extensive use of the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model 
and its refinements in transferring financial options to the real options domain. 
However, as noted by Loasby (2002), in a BSM world uncertainty is transformed to 
manageable risk in a closed system where every contingency can be specified with 
known probabilities. In such a setting decision makers have perfect knowledge and 
choice is reduced to a logical operation (Loasby, 1999).   
Our approach to real options follows a different line of reasoning by viewing firms as 
networks of reserves (Loasby, 1991; 1999; 2002), a pool of resources and 
capabilities (Kyläheiko et al. 2002), which generate flexibility in a world of 
incomplete knowledge where no-one knows how to specify appropriate contracts. 
Following Potts (2000), we adopt an open systems approach made up of elements 
and the connections between them but where the connections are incomplete. 
Uncertainty implies that knowledge changes with the passage of time and 
endogenous change involves reconfiguring connections, and constructing new 
connections, as knowledge about the system grows.    
 In the next section we develop a set of arguments to demonstrate that complexity 
and uncertainty are inherent within capability development, and given the 
evolutionary nature of the process, we argue that they constrain managerial actions; 
making both RBV and DCA less amenable to the development of normative 
prescriptions. Then, we discuss the appropriateness of real options concept for 
interpreting and managing the process of capability development in an open systems 
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environment. Next, we present a case study of a manufacturing facility that illustrates 
the capability development process using the real options lens. This is followed by a 
discussion where we integrate the results from our case study with ideas from the 
literature on complex systems and real options. Finally, we provide some concluding 
remarks.  
 
Impediments for normative prescription 
Strategy scholars are constantly challenged to prescribe how to achieve competitive 
advantage. However, it is logically impossible to formulate a set of rules to 
systematically create a competitive advantage. The intrinsic logic of both RBV and 
DCA and their emphasis on complexity, path-dependency, and the idiosyncratic 
nature of the phenomena produce impediments for any model that is used as part of 
some normative prescription. Our contention is that the RBV and DCA literatures 
has made a significant contribution in explaining why some firms are more 
successful than others but is less powerful in prescribing how to manage resources 
and capabilities. Operations management as a field of study, like other management 
fields, seeks to develop frameworks and procedures that can help us to frame 
problems that can offer guidance for practice, but any framework with ambition to 
guide action will have to confront the properties of the phenomena being 
investigated. To examine the phenomenon of capability development it will be 
helpful to adopt a classification based on system complexity and process complexity. 
System complexity  
We argue that the complexity of a capability is in its structural composition. A 
capability is never a singular or a distinctive item. It is comprised of a series of 
nested systems and each subsystem may deal with a different external 
environment. In other words, elements that constitute a capability do not exist in 
isolation from each other; they only have meaning and value when linked. This 
suggests that complexity in any system is a manifestation of the number and 
 7
diversity of the elements in the system and the nature of the connections among 
those elements (Potts, 2000).  
To motivate our discussion of system complexity it will be instructive to consider 
some definitions from the strategic management literature. A resource is often 
defined in terms of assets that a firm owns or has access to (Warren, 2002). 
Resources can be tangible assets such as facilities and process technology, or 
intangible, such as patents, brand name, reputation and trade secrets (Hall, 1992). If a 
resource is understood as a more or less a firm-specific asset to which a monetary 
value can be attached, a capability refers to a firm’s capacity to deploy and 
reconfigure resources. Makadok (2001) refers to a capability as a special type of a 
resource whose function improves the productivity of other resources. This implies 
that resources can represent a cluster of elements that constitutes a capability. In the 
Wal-Mart case study documented by Stalk et al. (1992), a firm’s assets, such as real 
estate, trucking fleet and information technology productively linked to other 
resources constitute a powerful logistic capability. Capabilities are often discussed in 
terms of level. For example, Verona (1999) classified capabilities into functional and 
integrative capabilities. The former allows a firm to deepen its functional knowledge, 
such as R&D expertise, manufacturing knowledge and marketing expertise. The 
latter binds different functional capabilities and additionally absorbs critical 
knowledge from external sources. It is difficult, however, due to system complexity, 
to develop an unambiguous hierarchy of capabilities and resources.  Brand name and 
corporate reputation are likely to be the outcome of a system of functional and 
integrative capabilities rather than a resource that underpins a marketing capability. 
On the other hand a firm-specific advanced process technology developed in-house 
may be an outcome of R&D and manufacturing expertise, but such a resource in turn 
can support a basic manufacturing capability and different integrative capabilities, 
such as quick new product development or flexibility in responding to customer 
demands. An integrative capability can refer to a firm’s ability to use external 
resources productively. Gulati (1998) defines network resources as entities in 
networks that provide informational advantage. Through the network firms can 
obtain access to resources that create value and capabilities that would otherwise 
require time to develop. This means that something that is seen as a capability from 
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the perspective of the firm can be interpreted as a resource from a network 
perspective. Furthermore, a firm’s network is an idiosyncratic resource, created 
through a path-dependent process and is therefore, more akin to a capability.  
 
Loasby’s (1998) interpretation of a capability as a particular kind of knowledge how 
puts even more weight on the system and complex nature of a capability. Within a 
discourse of knowledge a capability is depicted as collectively held knowledge 
(Spender, 1996), which arises from integration and co-ordination of specialised 
knowledge (Kogut and Zender, 1992; Grant, 1996). As Penrose (1959) noted, 
capabilities depend on team activity in which the knowledge and skills of individuals 
are transformed into the integrated knowledge of the organisation. A capability is 
therefore a system where dispersed knowledge is integrated. The integration is 
achieved by the co-ordination of different levels of knowledge. Conceptualising a 
capability as a system of integrated knowledge leads to acknowledging uncertainty as 
an intrinsic characteristic of a capability. Tsoukas (1996) argues that firms confront 
radical uncertainty, since nobody knows what patterns of knowledge integration is 
relevant in particular circumstances. This implies that causal ambiguity – an 
organisational phenomenon well documented in the strategic management field 
(Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Reed and DeFillipi, 1990; Collis, 1994) – is a particular 
form of uncertainty and refers to the fact that the knowledge of the capability’s 
underlying structure is always incomplete. If this is the case then the link between 
resources, capabilities and competitive advantage will not be readily decipherable. 
System complexity reveals bounded rationality, since managers encounter limited 
capacity when considering different patterns of knowledge integration. They 
confront limitations when the numerous possibilities of different patterns of 
integration are considered as well as when consequences of a particular integration 
are validated. The inability to know in advance what kind of knowledge integration 
is likely to be relevant introduces uncertainty as a result of the dynamic 
characteristics of the capability development process.  
Process complexity         
System complexity is characterised by a high level of interdependency among 
elements that constitute a capability but the ambiguous structure of the system is not 
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the only obstacle in the path of managers. DCA scholars (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) 
argue that capability development is a highly dynamic phenomenon. The 
evolutionary nature of the phenomenon is powerful in revealing how managers are 
constrained in their action to manage the process. The avowed dynamism of 
capability development is acknowledged by the operations strategy research 
community, however the accompanying uncertainty is largely ignored. An identified 
best practice is understood as a valuable capability, which has to be disaggregated 
into constitutive elements. When such a design of the new best way is revealed and 
contingencies determined, it is just a matter of time when this dominant knowing how 
will become widespread among other firms in the market place. What is neglected is 
the fact that a capability is not something that can be identified at the beginning of 
the process and they do not resemble phenomenon waiting to be discovered. 
Capability development is a generative process and capabilities are identified 
through retrospective sense-making as knowledge of organisational processes and 
markets evolve.     
Winter (2000) argues that capabilities emerge in primitive forms. This implies that 
system complexity might be low in the initial phase of capability development, but 
process complexity could be high; managers will be confronted by causal ambiguity 
in that they will have little understanding of the direction in which a process is likely 
to evolve or how market uncertainties are likely to be resolved. Thus, firms are 
unlikely to be able to identify in advance which resources or capabilities, if any, will 
become valuable, or how resources and capabilities should be integrated, or what 
configurations the market will value in the future, for as Loasby (1998) reminds us, 
resources and capabilities represents conjectures to be tested in the market, and like 
any conjecture, they may be false. During the capability development process system 
complexity is likely to be increasing and by the time a capability is identified, system 
complexity is high. Whilst during the process causal ambiguity might have given 
way to causal understanding, knowledge of causality is always incomplete.    
Causal understanding about the structure of a capability is due to the dynamic nature 
of the process and is always achieved ex post. The same holds true for a best 
practice. This suggests that the value of a particular practice can only be recognised 
ex post and cannot be planned ex ante. A firm’s current stock of resources or 
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capabilities depends critically on conditions that prevailed and decisions taken at 
some previous time. Since with the passage of time circumstances and knowledge 
about those circumstances change, a firm’s stock of resources and capabilities at any 
moment will always be less than desired given the knowledge the firm now has. 
Our argument is that operations management and operations strategy scholars have 
not sought to confront the uncertainty that surrounds choices about what future paths 
of resources and capabilities the firm should commit to. Uncertainty related to the 
complexity of a capability’s structure and to dynamic complexity of the process has 
been implicitly recognised, yet largely neglected. Furthermore, the uncertainty 
associated with the subjective nature of the choice decision, so relevant for 
organisational theorists, has been largely ignored by operations management 
scholars. This avoidance undoubtedly does not contribute to the development of 
normative frameworks for managing the capability development process.  
Real options and capabilities 
Starting from the premise that any resource or capability is embedded in a much 
larger system, we explore the interplay between systems and process complexity, and 
real options, through a more precise discourse based on the open systems approach 
proposed by Potts (2000) in his detailed study of complexity in economic systems 
and the recent work of Loasby (2002), who has elaborated on some of these ideas. A 
system consists of both elements and connections between them and though a system 
in itself can be a complex entity, it can serve as a building block for higher-level 
systems (Potts, 2000). We can distinguish between closed and open systems. In a 
closed system every element is connected to every other element, whereas in open 
systems, the set of elements and the set of connections between them are incomplete, 
and only a fraction of the possible connections may be operational (Loasby, 2002). In 
an open system change occurs by rearranging connections, or by constructing new 
connections, which produce different sets of sub-systems or a hierarchy of systems. 
For example, rearranging connections may involve some reconfiguration of a firm’s 
value chain and will involve the strengthening of some relationships whilst 
weakening others, such as would be the case in a supply chain by moving from 
parallel to single sourcing. Interpreting the firm as webs of multi-layered sets of 
connections is more meaningful than the idea that a firm is simply an endowment of 
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resources with differential productivities. Different connections form different 
systems and managerial activity will involve experimenting with these connections 
to form new entities with new routines, capabilities, and social behaviours (Potts, 
2000). As in our earlier discussion, a specific set of connections constitute a firm’s 
competences (Potts, 2000) and capabilities (Loasby, 2002); they are also resources, 
but they are a particular type of knowledge resource. It is the epistemic phenomena 
of knowledge that is to be emphasized, in that they are instances of specific 
connections that seem to work in particular environments.  
The suggestion is that the development of resources and capabilities follow a time 
consuming process by adding and rearranging connections. As a result, managers 
have to decide what resource and capabilities to commit to ahead of when they might 
be needed and at a time when their future value is uncertain. Faced with this situation 
firms will want to invest in resources and capabilities that have value in a range of 
circumstances. We contend that the real options approach has three redeeming 
features that offer some potential in thinking through this problem. First, the real 
options logic recognizes there is value in delaying investments by waiting for market 
and technological uncertainty to diminish before making a larger commitment. 
Second, many investments can be undertaken in stages and the real options logic is 
able to exploit the incremental learning associated with phased investments. Third, 
options provide a non-linear payoff structure in that purchasing an option enables a 
firm to take advantage of any upside potential whilst avoiding the downside risk. An 
option holder has the opportunity to take an action in the future should the situation 
prove attractive, but not the obligation, should events become unfavourable. 
It follows from this discussion that the possible different combinations of 
connections (which can be thought of as different configurations of the value chain 
system) represent different option sets (Loasby, 2002). A system moves through state 
space by rearranging connections, that is, by making differential investments in 
different value chain configurations. This explains why firms are different. When an 
option is exercised (a deepening of a commitment in a specific set of resources and 
capabilities), the resulting configuration will yield a different option set for future 
exercise. Resource accumulation and capability development are the outcome of a 
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sequential process of striking options, and throughout their history, firms will have 
taken different decisions about which option sets to strike.  
As the density of connectivity varies, it is possible to trace out different system 
structures, which are characterised by different dynamical behaviour (Waldrop, 
1992; Kauffman, 1993; and Potts, 2000). A highly connective structure is 
‘dynamically unstable’, producing ‘transient states’, as changes in one part of the 
system can produce ‘waves’ that ‘wash back and forth’ throughout the entire system 
(Potts, 2000, p. 90). If the density of connections is extremely low such that there is a 
high degree of independence between elements, the system ‘freezes up’ and the 
systems dominant behaviour is a continuation of the pattern that is frozen into the 
system. This structure is referred to by Potts (2000) as the ‘ordered state’ and it is 
likely to exhibit a high degree of inertia, making it difficult for the system to respond 
to change. High quality structures, according to Potts (2000), require the coexistence 
of both stability and flexibility. This is the state of ‘complexity’ - a balance between 
established routines and capabilities being ‘usefully’ locked into a system and 
continual experimentation with new ones (Potts, 2000). The real options approach 
makes explicit the need to maintain system flexibility so that new routines and 
capabilities can be adapted and absorbed within the system. 
Methodology 
This research was designed to allow information gathering for the purpose of 
interpreting decision-making relevant for capability accumulation within the setting 
where uncertainty is inherent. Consistent with this research intent, an in-depth case 
study research strategy was followed (Eisenhardt, 1989). Such a strategy is 
appropriate when dynamic phenomenon is studied (Langley, 1999) and when little 
prior research has been conducted (Yin, 1989). We have chosen to address the 
dynamics of the phenomenon by conducting one in-depth longitudinal and 
retrospective case research.  
Research setting 
To adhere to the logic of theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), a business 
unit within the aero-engine division of Rolls-Royce plc was selected, with the aim of 
providing a setting where the process of interest is transparent. Civil aerospace is a 
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cyclical industry and the commercial cycle is unpredictable; many factors influence 
the pattern of new aircraft orders. Civil aero-engine manufacturers make large 
commitments to design and R&D in engine technology and manufacturing processes. 
For these reasons manufacturers will forge alliances with risk-sharing partners to 
collaborate on development work and manufacturing. In addition, all manufacturers 
have extensive sub-contract networks. The success of Rolls-Royce as the major rival 
to GE Aircraft Engines is attributed to its strengths in gas turbine technology and its 
product range (Rolls-Royce has the largest portfolio of engines and powers more 
types of civil aircraft than any other manufacturer). The industry business context 
denotes new product development as a core business process; therefore, the 
capability to develop a wide range of engine types represents a crucial capability. 
Avowed flexibility in meeting customer demands, illustrated by the extensive 
product range, significantly influences the process of new product development. 
Large commitments under conditions of uncertainty to functional capabilities, such 
as R&D, manufacturing expertise, and investments in resources, necessitates the 
formation of alliances.  
Data collection 
A long and ongoing consultancy relation with the company enabled the research 
team to negotiate access for two researchers over a period of 2 years. In the field 
research archival documents and interviews were used as sources of evidence. 
Interviews with the key managers were the primary data collection method since 
these provided the richness and depth of data, particularly regarding managerial 
decisions. Twenty interviews were conducted with 5 senior managers. We conducted 
one group interview with 4 informants that lasted 4 hours. Other interviews typically 
lasted 2 hours. The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed in the hours 
immediately following the interviews. Additional observations were noted at the time 
of the interview. Some short follow-up interviews were made by telephone. Much 
useful data emerged from informal conversation with managers and engineers. The 
majority of interviews were open ended, although a list of core questions was 
prepared to address the relevant questions. A sample of the core questions include: 
q What decisions were made and what actions were conducted? 
q What were the key events? 
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q Why were these decisions made and what influenced these decisions? 
q How were these decisions brought about? 
q How did these decisions and actions influence the process of capability 
development? 
In this research extensive use was made of archival documents such as business 
plans, strategy documents, capital expenditure scheme proposals, and internal 
memorandums. A retrospective mode of research did not allow for a real time 
observation of how decisions were made and how they influenced capability 
development.  
Data analysis  
At the very first stage of our research some preliminary interviews were conducted in 
order to develop an understanding of the business context and to identify a particular 
project, whose development had to be traced. We were looking for a project with the 
following characteristics: 
q multiple decision points 
q incremental investments in resources and capabilities 
q trial and error learning and knowledge generation 
q irreversible commitments, and 
q identifiable outcomes of capability developments. 
When an appropriate project was identified, interviews were conducted and archival 
documents were used in order to develop a chronological picture of relevant events, 
decisions and actions. Identification of the process also determined key individuals 
for interviewing. A visual graphical representation (Miles and Huberman, 1984) was 
prepared for a group interview. This interview was used to enrich the visual map. 
The relevant events, decisions and actions were mapped chronologically. Context of 
each event and motivation for each decision were discussed. Effects of decisions and 
actions on capability development processes were indicated. Such a visual map 
represented an intermediary step between the row data and a more general 
 15
understanding. The group interview was followed by additional interviews were a 
general interpretation of the studied process started to emerge. The entire analysis 
was, therefore highly iterative and involved moving back and forth among the data as 
the concepts emerged during the inductive mode of the research.    
The Case Study 
The case covers the period 1992 until early 2001 and describes the decisions that 
were taken by NGV Machining (NGVM), a business unit within the Rolls-Royce 
Aero Engine Group employing 170 engineers and support staff, to develop a ‘world’s 
best’ capability in the design, manufacture and testing of nozzle guide vanes 
(NGVs). There are several manufacturers of NGVs and components are sourced 
from a network of suppliers. NGVs are precision-engineered parts, designed to 
reduce the operating temperature of the turbo-fans by directing cold air pulled into 
the fan rotor from the air that by-passes the combustion chamber.  
During the period 1989 – 1992 NGVM experimented with the concept of the multi-
skilled engineer (MSE) based around team working and simplified material flow. 
This initiative led to a number of performance improvements, such as reduced 
inventory and non-conformance, culminating in cost savings of £2.6 million over the 
period.  Demands on the system brought about by more exacting engineering 
standards from a new generation of engine designs, and spurred by the success of 
MSE, the senior management team of NGVM sought category ‘A’ status (core 
business for Rolls-Royce) for NGV manufacturing and applied for financial support 
to expand the in-house facility. In 1992 the application to develop this facility was 
approved. Table 1 identifies events and the major decisions that were taken by 
NGVM over the period 1989 - 2001.  
Phase One, 1992 - 1996 
In 1992 NGVM set out a strategy to expand the manufacturing facility for NGV 
components that were to shape capability development for the next ten years. The 
background to this decision lay in an earlier period, 1989 – 1992, when in response 
to a drive to improve performance by the parent department, Turbine Aerofoil 
Manufacturing, the existing set of machine tools were reconfigured to form a 
machining cell and through initiatives such as multi-skilling, multi-machine manning 
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and in cycle working, working practices were changed. These changes created a set 
of reserves by generating greater mobility and flexibility in the system. Reserves 
have option value because they are a form of contingency enabling NGVM to 
respond more effectively to a broader range of unforeseen events. Reserves 
constitute a timing option as they provide an opportunity, but not the obligation, to 
make a range of adjustments in the future. 
The decision to expand was made against a background of considerable market and 
technological uncertainty. By 1992 the economic cycle for aircraft deliveries had 
moved well away from its peak in 1990 and both the UK and USA were still in 
recession. Although the cyclical nature of the industry is well understood, forecasting 
the length and magnitude of these cycles is problematic. There were two sources of 
technological uncertainty for NGVM; uncertainty associated with the integration of 
new machine tools and a related problem associated with performance uncertainty of 
NGV components for new engines during simulations and testing. In response to 
both types of uncertainty a decision was made to stage the investment and extend the 
application of MSE cells, where some successes had been achieved.  
A phased investment constitutes an option set, where each phase completed 
(investment in an additional machining cell plus the learning associated with 
cumulative production), gave NGVM the option to invest in the next phase. Options 
within the set evolve along a trajectory as opportunities to invest in subsequent 
phases are accelerated, deferred, or abandoned, depending on how market and 
technological uncertainties unfold. NGVM’s managers were not passive in this 
process. By making the investment, undertaking production and making adjustments 
in real time, they generated learning options, where current costs of production 
become an option on future production, the payoff from which is a reduction of 
future costs and other productivity benefits, such as reduced inventory, lead times, 
and non-conformance. It is learning by doing and using. Accumulated learning in 
cellular manufacturing reduced the risk for NGVM of introducing new technology 
and falsely moving to a new state and having an inappropriate set of capabilities. By 
the end of 1994, the first full year of operation for the new cells, cost savings from 
avoiding the network amounted to £4.2 million, lead times had been reduced from 21 
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to 14 weeks on average, and there were significant reductions in both inventory and 
non-conformance.  
Phase Two, 1996 – 1997 
In late 1996 a decision was made to accelerate investment in a second phase by 
adding a third cell. This decision was taken largely as a result of an unprecedented 
upsurge in demand for aircraft; a combination of the delivery cycle moving from its 
trough in 1994 and the market share gains being made by Rolls-Royce. Approval 
was granted in early 1997 and the cell was fully operational by early 1998.  
Projections of load-capacity comparisons indicated that without this additional 
investment, in-house capacity would be half that of total task by the year 2000, but 
offloading this amount of work onto the sub-contract network raised two important 
issues. First, the network had become severely capacity-constrained and could not 
absorb this amount of offload. Second, further investments in the in-house facility 
had widened the performance gap, as implied by the productivity improvements 
given above.  
The network constitutes a pool of resources and capabilities, which provide NGVM 
with the flexibility to defer its own investments by making use of the network. A 
decision made in 1992 to reduce NGVM’s dependence on the network in order to 
prove the viability of the second cell, meant that network benefits could be forfeited 
if these activities are internalised. To make available the real options in a network 
requires investment and continual maintenance of the relationships by the network 
partners. By incurring network costs, largely coordination costs, NGVM effectively 
purchased a set of options on the network. The network options provide NGVM with 
the opportunity, but not the obligation, to participate in a range of network benefits, 
including the opportunity to defer its own investments. Foregoing these investments 
effectively kills-off the network options but such a decision has to be balanced 
against the investments that had been made by the mid 1990s in developing the in-
house facility, and the preferential access this gave NGVM to make further 
investments for returns they believed would be more favourable than could be 
obtained on the network. By early 1998 NGV manufacturing in the UK had become 
a two-tier system, with NGVM sourcing all the high value added, high volume 
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components for the new generation of engines (category A parts), whilst the network 
sourced much of the remainder. 
Phase Three, 1997 - 2001 
In late 1997 the senior management team revisited the load-capacity issue and their 
projections indicated that without further investments there would have to be 
offloads for category ‘A’ components. With some reduction in both market and 
technological uncertainty a decision was made to accelerate investment and a 
proposal was prepared that set out the case for investing in three additional cells. The 
proposal also made the case for an investment in state of art machine tools using 
technology currently being developed in-house by Rolls-Royce and its technology 
partners. 
Investments in phases one and two represent capability development through 
cumulative incremental improvements as NGVM increased its capabilities in 
combining cell teams with proven machine tool technology. The proposal for the 
third phase represented a much greater degree of experimentation with new and as 
yet unproven technology. At this point NGVM were faced with a dilemma because 
in spending time and funding on exploration it could create a diversion of resources, 
which could slow down its accumulation of learning with the current technology. At 
the same time, engaging in exploration reduces the possibility of inertia and the path 
dependent constraints associated with incremental investments and local learning. 
Experimenting with the new technology during the period 1998 – 2001 created a 
‘switching option’. Switching in this case means having the ability to extend the 
different uses of the cells. Such an investment requires higher sunk costs but the 
payoff is the ability to produce a diverse product range and the ability to meet 
different performance standards, with the minimal sacrifice in operating costs 
compared with more conventional technology.  
Capability development in NGVM combined with the advances being made through 
the integration of advanced machine tool technology produced productivity 
improvements in contiguous processes, such as engine design and testing. This is an 
example where advances being made in one part of the system can generate options 
in other parts. NGVM’s emerging capability in machining high precision sculptured 
components created product options for engine designers. Product options are created 
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from perceiving an opportunity to create a new or improved product and where a 
business has the resources assembled, and the capabilities, to develop and produce 
the product. An example is swept fan aerofoil technology, unique to Rolls-Royce (to 
be used for the first time in the Trent 900 engine to power the Airbus A380 when it 
comes into service in 2006), became possible as a result of advances in high 
precision measurement and inspection, drilling and machining in areas such as NGV 
manufacturing.      
Discussion 
We have argued that resources and capabilities are embedded in much larger systems 
and that real options offers a heuristic for understanding capability development in 
complex systems, where knowledge is partial, ambiguous, and where uncertainty can 
never be completely resolved. A case study was used to illustrate how a real options 
lens can provide a better understanding of the way in which resources were 
accumulated and capabilities had been developed in a manufacturing environment 
where market and technological uncertainty remained high throughout the period of 
the study. As discussed below, the case study integrates prior literature and provides 
some insights for strategic management and operations management in particular. 
Complexity and the Evolving Nature of the Process 
In a recent paper Kogut and Kulatilaka (2001) suggested that the real merit of the 
options heuristic is in the potential to know the value of a change in capabilities in 
moving to a different point in state space. It would be useful to know the value of 
different configurations of capabilities and real options has the potential to do this. 
As Kogut and Kulatilaka (2001) explain, the value of changing resources and 
capabilities requires an evaluation of the uncertain costs of changing position against 
the future unknown reward. The real options approach to capability development 
would do this by computing expected values of changing position in the future based 
on current market values (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001). However, the knowledge 
required to undertake such an evaluation should not be underestimated. Consistent 
with the literature (Penrose, 1959; Loasby, 1999), the case revealed that a firm may 
start from a position of considerable ambiguity about the direction of change, and 
from this, knowledge grows by purposeful trial and error from constructing 
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connections, to yield capabilities to make further connections. Knowledge 
accumulates as a firm operates with its current stock of resources, and increases in 
knowledge raise the prospect of extending the range and amount of services 
available. The case illustrated that experience and knowledge acquired by NGVM 
over the period helped to form new connections by building routines and capabilities 
centred around MSE and cellular manufacturing, which enabled them to develop 
more productive resources and capabilities, accumulate further knowledge from 
pushing out the boundaries in using machine tool technology, and so on.  
Resources that provide a broader range of services can afford a firm some flexibility, 
which is especially valuable when the future evolution of opportunities is unknown. 
Flexibility has option value, which suggests that a useful heuristic would be for 
managers to build flexibility into the system. Prior literature (e.g. Kauffman, 1993; 
Potts, 2000) suggests that a state of complexity represents a balance between stability 
and the ability to remain flexible, such that there are routines, standard operating 
procedures, skills and habits, the competences or capabilities of a firm, that are 
enduring, yet can be adapted to a range of uses. This brings us to the notion of 
viewing the firm as a set of reserves (Loasby, 1991 and 2002), which create options, 
and the importance of acquiring and developing reserves as a response to a range of 
threats and opportunities in an uncertain world. We did find the idea of firms-as-
reserves figured strongly at several points over the period documented in the case, 
particularly in the initial phase, 1989 – 1992, where it was a motivating force for 
change, and again in the third phase, 1997 – 2001, when state-of-art technology was 
introduced as a means of reconciling conflicting demands from the need to maintain 
volume production of high-precision engineered components and the need to provide 
a fast response to engineering and testing. In completing the investment for phase 
three we can view NGVM has an adaptive system utilizing capabilities and resources 
in different input combinations, or converting inputs into outputs at different 
conversion rates, making it more responsive to market demands and changing 
competitive conditions.  
When the direction of change is unknown prior literature (Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1998; Potts, 2000; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001) has emphasized the merits of 
exploration through investing in probes, by adding to or rearranging the present set 
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of connections. To reduce the risks for a firm in adopting radical change in its 
capabilities, Kogut and Kulatilaka (2001) suggest recombination; that is, exploring 
connections that recombine current resources with new ones. We can relate this point 
to our earlier discussion on complex systems. In a complex system a balance can be 
maintained, such that if one part of the system is in an ordered state the other part can 
be free to behave with more freedom, or, in the context of our discussion, 
experimentally (Potts, 2000). The suggestion is that as a firm develops capabilities 
and gains confidence in one part of the system it may be able to experiment with 
other parts without jeopardising the entire system. Our case lends some support to 
this idea. During the 1990s, a distinctive set of capabilities evolved in design, 
manufacture and testing of high value added components, and this increase in 
confidence prompted a series of adaptive experimentations, in both work practices 
and machine tool technology.  
One might argue that NGVM identified the options that were the most obvious to 
exploit, as they tended to involve transitions to adjacent states. This brings us to what 
is seemingly an obvious point, but an important one, that options have to be 
recognised (Bowman and Hurry, 1993) before they can be evaluated, and the options 
that are recognised are likely to represent a small proportion of the options that are 
potentially available. Recognizing options is concerned with making sense of 
situations, and as Loasby (2002) remarks, ‘sense is to be made rather than revealed’ 
(p. 8). We can make a connection here to one of the central contributions of Penrose 
(1959); the concept of subjectivity of productive opportunities, which combines the 
idea of the environment as an ‘image’ in the entrepreneurs mind, with the insight that 
the ‘productive opportunities’ are the possibilities that managers conceive and ‘can 
take advantage of’ (p 31). This suggests that options are the product of mental 
conceptions, but as Witt (1998) observes, conceiving in organisations is not an 
individual act, but the outcome of ‘socially shared interpretations and patterns’, and 
these emerge from the experiences and knowledge generated within the firm.       
This suggests that a capability is a socially constructed phenomenon since managers 
impart meaning and value to the knowledge a firm possesses. Managers largely 
influence the process of capability development and their decisions are framed by 
their cognition about the value of a capability and its productive opportunities. 
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Cognition, however, is also an evolutionary process and accompanies the capability 
development process. Within this cognitive process, mechanisms such as sense-
making (Daft and Weick, 1984), interpretation (Thomas et al. 1993) and imagination 
(Witt, 1998) play an important role in coping with uncertainty. 
Networks 
Our case study suggests that processes within NGVM, its routines, operating 
procedures, habits and skills, are generators of knowledge and this knowledge is a 
major influence on the real options that become available as well as the timing of 
these options. The process is emergent and unpredictable, as NGVM cannot know 
what knowledge it will possess in the future and the uses it is likely to make of such 
knowledge. Equally, the case suggests that the subcontract network and the variety of 
collaborative arrangements are also generators of knowledge and make available a 
variety of real options. It is well understood in the literature (Richardson, 1972; 
Coombs and Metcalfe, 2000; Madhok, 2002) that different governance structures 
lead to differences in their potential to generate knowledge, and consequently, their 
potential to accumulate capabilities and generate options. Different modes represent 
different bundles of resources and capabilities, and as suggested by Madhok (2002), 
if a firm possesses the appropriate governance skills, it can select a production set 
from a range of possibilities and is not restricted to its own production technology. 
The literature has emphasized the benefits of networks over internal organisation 
(Coombs and Metcalfe, 2000; Madhok, 2002), suggesting that networks provide 
benefits that could not be available to a single firm. From an options perspective this 
conclusion should be treated with some caution. 
Our case study suggests that NGVM were not facing the kind of optimisation 
problem suggested in the real options literature (e.g. Sanchez, 2000), where the 
problem is to maximize the value of the different option sets over all governance 
modes. Our discussion of both systems and process complexity should alert us to the 
difficulties of performing this task. Different governance modes (internal 
organisation and the subcontract network) have embedded in them different sets of 
options, so that in choosing to develop its internal capabilities, NGVM sacrificed the 
value that could be made available by developing the network. As illustrated by the 
case, NGVM made commitments to build capabilities in support of a particular mode 
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of governance, the in-house facility, and the resulting expenditure represented a sunk 
cost, in that it was specific to a particular governance choice and could not be fully 
recovered. The irreversibility inherent in this decision, coupled with the uncertainty, 
is what makes the option valuable. Irreversibility imposes what Argyres and 
Liebeskind (2000) refer to as a 'governance switching constraint', which suggests that 
governance modes are the outcome of idiosyncratic and path-dependent processes.  
Whilst we can agree with Madhok (2002), that networks provide substantial scope 
for learning, it does not follow that it will always be the preferred mode when market 
and technological uncertainty is high. In addition to the idea of firms as reserves, 
Madhok's (2002) argument overlooks the benefits of a modular organisation 
structure, such as was developed by NGVM, as an alternative approach to 
organisational and technological problem solving based on decomposability. Whilst 
the principles of modularity for managing technological design are well known, the 
application of the idea to organisational design is more recent (e.g. Sanchez and 
Mahoney, 1996; Langlois, 1999; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Decomposability 
reduces the number of connections in a system by partitioning tasks, but the benefits 
of separability for NGVM were not fully realized until phase three, when three more 
cells were added. Modularity is a response to the problems of dispersed and tacit 
knowledge – inherent features of complex systems. Connections between cells can 
be kept low and knowledge need not be communicated to all parts of the system. 
Within modular structures the whole system may not be consciously designed, but 
emerges as an adaptive process. Modularity is compatible with staged investments, it 
enables the firm to learn, and as the firm learns and develops its capabilities, it 
creates options to benefit from emergent and unforeseen events.    
Conclusion 
According to RBV and DCA resources and capabilities with differential 
productivities are a source of performance differentials across firms. From this 
perspective it is natural for both researchers and managers to enquire into how the 
resources and capabilities with the desired attributes can be identified, developed, 
and managed. Our contention in this paper has been that many of the strategically 
important resources and capabilities are embedded in dense and highly complex 
clusters both within and across networks of firms. Systems complexity would 
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suggest that attempts to identify and then isolate specific resources or capabilities for 
development is fraught with difficulties. In making the connection between 
resources, capabilities and knowledge our paper highlights the second phenomena we 
discussed, process complexity. Resources and capabilities develop and change over 
time as knowledge changes. The process of how a firm acquires its capabilities 
cannot be separated from how it acquires its knowledge. Much of the knowledge we 
have been concerned with comes from experience as managers learn to solve 
problems and in doing so accumulate knowledge and acquire capabilities which are 
used to build up the firm’s resource base.  
Knowledge is problematic, and therefore tentative, it accumulates through a process 
of purposeful trial and error. In this respect, the knowledge acquired by the firm 
represent conjectures, and like any conjecture, they are fallible, as they are subject to 
continuous testing in the market. In highlighting the problematic nature of 
knowledge and capability development the paper makes a potentially important 
contribution to the operations management literature. Our examination of complex 
systems within the context of a manufacturing operation offers a cautionary note to 
research that either explicitly, or implicitly, assumes that managers have knowledge 
they could not reasonably be expected to have. Formulating prescriptions on the 
basis that managers have perfect, or near perfect, knowledge can only lead to 
outcomes that are misleading and over-simplistic as guides for action.    
When systems and process complexity are significant, we contend that a real options 
approach provides a useful set of tools for thinking about capability development. 
We illustrated these points using a case study describing incremental investment in a 
strategically important manufacturing operation for a large aerospace company 
where difficult governance choice decisions had to be resolved. The case was 
interpreted using the real options lens and we discussed the contribution of real 
options in building flexibility as a response to uncertainty and systems complexity.   
This paper explicitly addresses the capability development process and more 
implicitly networking and investment decisions in manufacturing technology. All 
these present phenomena of interest for operations management. These phenomena 
however are socially complex, ambiguous and subject to uncertainty, and therefore, 
less amenable for producing prescriptive knowledge for improving short-term 
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organisational performance. Operations management scholars should not hold back 
in their study of such phenomena for it is only in developing this knowledge can the 
field provide managers with a touchstone when confronting an ambiguous situation. 
This may require researchers to lessen their ties with the field’s intellectual 
foundation and integrate their research with other management fields. If such 
research does result in the creation of conceptual knowledge, it will lead to the 
operations management discipline having a firmer identity.  
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Table I. Chronology of events and decisions taken 
 
 
Dates Events Decisions and actions 
taken 
Comments 
1989 – 1992 Turbine Aerofoil seek cost 
reductions and other 
performance improvements 
from its business units. 
Introduction of MSE 
and formation of 
NGV manufacturing 
cells.  
 
New experience curve – 
creation of learning option.    
 
1992 – 1995 Some successes with MSE 
experiment – cost savings 
of £2.6 million over the 
period 1989-1992.  
 
Introduction of new 
generation of aero-engines 
i.e. the Trent family, raise 
engineering and technical 
standards for core 
components. 
 
Aircraft delivery cycle 
moves from its 1990 peak. 
Funding sought to 
expand the facility by 
adding a second cell. 
 
Funding approved 1992 and 
second cell comes on stream 
in 1993. 
 
Bid to receive ‘A’ 
category status for NGV 
manufacturing.  
 
Decision taken to reduce 
dependency on the 
network. 
NGV designated a ‘core’ 
component by Turbine 
Aerofoil 
 
Creation of compound 
option – opportunity for 
‘follow-on’ investments 
 
1994 - cost savings of £4.2 
million in first full year of 
operation for second cell. 
 
Implications for the viability 
of some units within the 
network – abandonment of 
network options. 
1996 – 1997 Unprecedented surge in 
demand for aircraft as 
economic cycle moves out 
from its trough in 1995. 
 
Network becomes capacity-
constrained. 
Sought approval to 
expand the facility by 
adding a third cell using 
technology already 
proven in second cell. 
 
Funding approved 1997 and 
third cell comes on stream in 
1998. 
Growth option created. 
 
Two-tier system emerged for 
NGV manufacturing, and 
category A parts sole 
sourced by NGVM. 
 
 
1997 – 2001 Economic expansion in 
North America continues to 
fuel world airline growth 
and number of orders 
increase. 
 
Substantial gains made in 
operating performance but 
need greater flexibility and 
to drive down lead times. 
 
Latest generation of Trent 
engines raise the bar for 
engineering, i.e. measuring, 
inspecting, drilling and 
machining. 
 
Offloading certain category 
A parts to the network. 
Sought approval to 
expand the facility by 
adding two more cells 
and a welding facility. 
 
Funding approved 1998. 
Decision made to use 
state of art machine 
tools rather than source 
from the market. 
Machine tool 
technology becomes 
proprietary. Lengthens 
profit window and 
increases option values.  
 
Growth, switching and 
further learning options 
created. 
 
Technical problems delay 
the development of machine 
tools and computer 
programme writing. 
 
Additional cells scheduled to 
come on stream early 2000, 
delayed until mid 2001. 
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